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This thesis introduces a framework for providing decision support for systems in 
wireless environments. The decision support framework utilizes game-theoretic principles 
to produce a metric, known as utility, that quantifies the expected benefit of executing an 
action for given environmental variables. From a set of utility values, a set of corresponding 
actions can be ranked from most to least advisable, providing an objective means to 
determine the optimal action under the given constraints.  
In the first section, the decision support framework and its major components are 
introduced and their purpose explained. In the second section, an adapted version of the 
framework is applied to the problem of electronic warfare (EW). This section highlights 
the design choices that were made to implement the framework so that, under various 
simplifying assumptions, decision support could be provided to a radar jammer. The third 
section introduces a simulated non-cooperative game between two players – an emitter and 
a jammer – in which each player attempts to maximize its own utility. Each player makes 
decisions using a MATLAB implementation of the decision support framework as it was 
adapted for electronic warfare. The game is simulated for multiple initial conditions with 
the actions of the players being recorded, and those results are used to show that the players 
behave in a rational manner. This work concludes with an analysis of the results obtained 









1.1 General Overview 
While it is possible for human operators to make decisions for a wireless system, 
automation of the decision-making process is often desirable in real-time scenarios. For 
example, a network router may need to decide how to prioritize servicing traffic from 
different clients or a radar may need to decide how to schedule its scanning pattern. In these 
environments, automatic decision support could dramatically decrease response time while 
simultaneously improving the quality of the decisions.  
Fundamentally, these two examples are the same when viewed through a game-
theoretic framework: the system seeks to maximize its performance subject to some 
restrictions. Under a game-theoretic framework, the decision-making process hinges on 
how the various options are evaluated. For the example of a network router, the 
performance could be measured by the importance of the request, and the restriction could 
be a finite bandwidth. A game-theoretic framework is also robust to uncertainty, which, for 
the example of a router, could take the form of packet loss over an unreliable connection. 
Such a framework would enable the router to decide which clients receive service in a 
utilitarian manner. 
A general-purpose, game-theoretic, modular framework that has been designed to 




work. The chief design goal for this framework was flexibility, and a modular approach 
allows the framework to be applied to many different types of wireless applications.  
This flexibility will be illustrated through an example problem that consists of a 
simulated competition between two agents in a wireless environment. An agent is defined 
as any entity that is capable of perceiving its environment and reacting to it in a rational 
manner [1]. In the example application, each autonomous agent is tasked with making 
decisions that are rational in the context of an EW environment. A solution to this problem 
is proposed in terms of an implementation of the decision framework, and a non-
cooperative game was designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the implementation. 
This game consists of two agents, a jammer and an emitter, that utilize the decision 
framework to choose the responses that maximize the expected utility for the time step 
immediately following their respective actions. For the sake of clarity, the word emitter is 
used to represent a radar system interested in self-protection. This game was simulated for 
multiple time steps and initial conditions, and the results are analyzed in Chapter 4.  
The general framework consists of three modules, each of which can be altered or 
substituted while still maintaining overall functionality. The three modules are the 
adversary identification module, the utility calculator module, and the optimization 
module. Each of these modules draws upon a repository of the current body of knowledge, 
collectively known as the knowledge base. Relevant information may include observed 
data, environmental models, or models of known agents. The adversary identification 
module analyzes the information provided by the knowledge base to determine if there are 
any nearby competing agents. Ultimately, the adversary identification module produces a 




utility calculator to compute the expected utility of each action available to the agent. 
Finally, the optimization module sorts the actions according to their utility, in a manner 
determined by user preference. 
 This work describes in more detail the material presented at the 2016 IEEE Radar 
Conference [2]. 
1.2 Utility and Utility Functions 
In order for an agent to make rational decisions, it must be able to predict the 
effectiveness of its potential actions. The expected benefit an agent receives from an action 
is called the utility of the action. Individual utility values are calculated from utility 
functions that map one or more parameters of interest to the unit interval.  
Utility functions allow dissimilar actions to be directly compared. For example, in 
a wireless system, if utility represents signal strength, then a utility function could evaluate 
utility as a function of the distance between a transmitter and the receiver, where the utility 
decreases as the distance increases. For the same application, a separate utility function 
could evaluate the utility as a function of the transmitted power. The resulting utility values 
and, by proxy, the parameters they represent could then be directly compared against each 
other. While distance, transmitted power, and signal strength are all physically related, 
utility functions also allow comparisons between parameters that are not so easily relatable, 
such as transmitted power and the modulation scheme.  
Additionally, utility functions provide a way for an agent to make rational decisions 
in the presence of uncertainty. In [3], von Neumann and Morgenstern laid out the 
foundations for game theory and utility-based decision making. They argued that a rational 




satisfied, a utility function can be formulated that allows the agent to behave rationally. An 
agent whose actions are chosen through a method satisfying the axioms of completeness, 
transitivity, continuity, and independence as expressed in [3] is said to be von Neumann-
Morgenstern (VNM) rational. Throughout this work, the utility of an action will be 
represented by a single-parameter utility function that satisfies VNM rationality. VNM-
rational utility functions allow an agent to compare an arbitrary number of complex actions 
simultaneously, even in the presence of uncertainty. However, in general, finding a 
meaningful mapping for each action while ensuring that VNM-rationality remains satisfied 
(transitivity, in particular) may be difficult.   
1.3  Electronic Warfare 
 Electronic warfare is the strategic use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for 
militaristic purposes. The field of EW consists of three disciplines: electronic attack (EA), 
electronic protection (EP), and electronic support [4]. The purpose of EA is to diminish the 
effectiveness of an opposing radar. EP is utilized to counteract an adversary’s EA efforts. 
Electronic support is a broad term covering applications in EW that do not directly fall 
under either EA or EP, but is typically for the purposes of gathering information. The EW 
application discussed in this paper will focus on the jammer’s decision-making process. 
Therefore, this section will focus on describing the EA actions available to the jammer.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, the goal of a radar is to gather information about a 
target by actively scanning the environment for EM waveforms. Once a radar discovers a 
target in the environment, tracking of the target’s position and velocity may become 
possible. Before the radar discovers the target, the objective of the jammer is to deny the 




confuse the radar and force it to lose track of the target. For this application, the target is 
equipped with a self-screening jammer. In other words, the jammer is attempting to prevent 
itself from being detected and tracked. To protect itself, the jammer has access to three 
masking techniques – barrage noise (BN), responsive spot noise (RSN), and Doppler noise 
(DN) – and two deception techniques: velocity gate pull-off (VGPO) and range false targets 
(RFT). 
Masking techniques are designed to subvert the radar’s efforts to detect a target [4]. 
All three of the jammer’s masking techniques are noise-based attacks that attempt to 
prevent a radar from gaining information by overwhelming it with noisy data. BN uses a 
wide-bandwidth signal to deny as much of the EM spectrum as possible. RSN is similar to 
BN but is used when the center frequency of the radar’s signal is known [5]. Jamming a 
narrow band centered on the radar’s frequency allows the jammer to focus its power, 
allowing for a stronger, more focused jamming effort. DN is a coherent masking technique 
that applies phase modulation to the received radar signal [4]. The phase-modulated signal 
is rebroadcast with the intended effect of denying the radar the ability to determine the 
target’s speed.  
Deception techniques attempt to fool the victim radar into believing false 
information, making it difficult to track the true target [4]. False targets techniques attempt 
to deceive the radar by modulating and rebroadcasting the radar’s signal in order to 
generate false targets for the radar to track. RFT creates false target returns at many 
different ranges from the radar, disguising the radar’s true position. If the radar cannot 
distinguish between the real and false targets, it is forced either to track all of them, which 




attempt to break a radar’s track on a target. These techniques occur in multiple stages. First, 
the jammer amplifies and rebroadcasts the radar’s signal. This action provides the radar 
with a stronger return than the signal reflecting off the true target and may cause the radar 
to begin tracking the amplified signal being emitted by the jammer instead. The jammer 
then begins to modulate the signal so that the return no longer represents the true location 
or velocity of the target. After some time has passed, the jammer will stop broadcasting the 
signal. If successful, the radar will have lost track of the target.  
1.4 Assumptions and Terminology 
In this research, both EA and EP applications are discussed. For both applications, 
simplifying assumptions have been made. With additional information and analysis, these 
assumptions could be replaced in order to represent more realistic scenarios. 
For the purposes of generality, it is assumed that an agent can operate in one of 
several modes. For the EW application, the jammer has five modes of operation, 
corresponding to the five actions it can chose from: BN, RSN, DN, RFT, and VGPO. The 
emitter also has five modes, where each mode is designed to be particularly effective 
against a different one of the jammer’s modes. These modes are referred to as Anti-BN, 
Anti-RSN, etc. Agents are also assumed to have access to a library of information that can 
be referenced in order to make inferences about their opponent’s actions. This library 
should contain models of the different agents (both friendly and unfriendly) that are 
common in the environment. This information can then be compared to the waveforms 




A received signal is compared against each model in the library, and a probability 
value is assigned to represent how strongly the agent believes its opponent is of the 
corresponding model. A similar process also computes the probability that the agent’s 
opponent is operating in one of several operating modes. The term state is used to denote 
the combination of a particular model operating in a particular mode.  
For illustration of the non-cooperative game, only a single jammer and a single 
emitter are assumed to be operating in the environment. As previously mentioned, both the 
jammer and the emitter are restricted to operate in one of five modes. These modes are the 
actions that the agent can take. The goal of the jammer is to maximize its utility. The emitter 
seeks to minimize the jammer’s utility by correctly switching into the mode that best 
defends against the jammer’s chosen attack. For the example application of the framework, 
jammers are only interested in attack and emitters are only interested in self-protection. 
1.5 Related Work 
There are two main challenges that must be addressed by a wireless decision 
support framework: the first consists of extracting meaningful information from a received 
waveform, and the second is processing that information for the purpose of rational 
decision making. Both of these challenges have been the subject of extensive research in a 
variety of fields. 
1.5.1 Wireless Identification and Classification  
The ability to identify and classify objects through exploitation of the 
electromagnetic spectrum is one of the key problems in the field of wireless 
communications. A sample of proposed solutions to related applications is presented here, 




understanding of this topic. An overview of basic radar classification concepts can be found 
in Smith et al. [6]. 
Gader et al. propose a method of improving the detection of landmines using 
ground penetrating radar in [7]. Their contribution is the application of hidden Markov 
models (HMM) to increase the probability of mine detection. In a HMM, data is 
periodically measured in the form of observations. Intuitively, these observations are 
measurable features of the modeled system, such as temperature, force, or wavelength, that 
give probabilistic insight into the unobservable (hidden) state of the system. For example, 
imagine three identical, closed boxes, one of which contains a ball. Which box contains 
the ball (the state) is unknown, and the boxes cannot be opened (the state is hidden). 
However, the boxes can be weighed. Those measurements (the observations) can then be 
used to infer which box contains the ball. This example is degenerate because one 
measurement is sufficient to determine the state with high certainty. Usually, HMMs are 
applied to time-series applications, such as recognition tasks [8][9], where the state of the 
system changes over time and observations are non-deterministic indicators of the hidden 
state.  
The approach detailed by Gader et al. uses two different HMMs: a background 
model and a mine model. The background model accounts for the cases when a mine is not 
present, reducing the chances of false positives. For the mine model, they observed that 
when a mine is detected the GPR data resembles an inverted parabola, so they chose to use 
five states: a starting background state, the rising edge of the parabola, the crest, the falling 
edge, and the ending background state. Over time, the system accumulates observations 




model. A likelihood ratio test is then performed between the probabilities for the 
terminating states of each model, subject to a variable false alarm rate. Their experiments 
in the field demonstrated exceptional performance in terms of their desired benchmarks. 
Efforts in using radar to perform indoor, through-the-wall target classification are 
typically complicated by the presence of clutter. In [10], a method was proposed to 
differentiate between indoor clutter and human bodies through the application of a support 
vector machine (SVM). SVMs are a machine learning technique that use a decision 
boundary to convert raw data into a binary classification. The decision boundary consists 
of a separating hyperplane defined by a set of points, known as the support vectors. The 
algorithm seeks to maximize the margin, or the distance between the support vectors and 
the decision boundary. This separation is accomplished by iteratively updating the decision 
boundary until the classifier is optimized for a set of pre-classified training data. Training 
data consists of features, their values, and a label. Once an SVM is trained, it can be applied 
to unclassified data in order to generate a classification.  
In [10], the radar cross section (RCS), a measurement of how well an object reflects 
radar waves, was measured for multiple variations of the frequency, aspect angle, and type 
of polarization, where each combination of these values produced a new feature. Reducing 
the number of features used to train the SVM is often desirable, which can be accomplished 
by determining which features best discriminate the data and discarding the rest. Two 
feature selection algorithms were used for this purpose. The first ranks features by their 
Fisher score, which is a measure of how much information that feature provides. 
Thresholding is then used to select the best features. The second uses the RELIEFF 




weights are updated iteratively according to how close a given feature vector is to the 
closest members of each class. Features that have many, identically-classified instances 
near each other will have higher scores. Likewise, features with many instances classified 
far away from oppositely-classified instances will have higher scores. Although the paper 
does not state so explicitly, the best features are presumably selected using thresholding, 
as before. 
The approach proposed in [10] was tested for both simulated and experimental data, 
for each of the feature selection algorithms in addition to the full feature set, for linear and 
RBF kernels, and for scenarios with and without noise introduced from various types of 
walls, including drywall, plywood, and brick. The success of the classifier was heavily 
dependent on the SNR: weak signals failed to outscore random classification, while strong 
signals often resulted in classification accuracy of over 90%. Comparisons of performance 
between kernels and styles of polarization are difficult because the axes are inconsistently 
spaced, but the RBF kernel appears to outperform the linear kernel in most – if not all – 
trials, while both styles of polarization scored similarly on the simulated data. For 
experimental data, the SVM trained on data captured using vertical, co-polarization 
outperformed the SVM trained on data captured using horizontal, co-polarization.  
 
1.5.2 Game Theory 
Since being introduced, game theory has seen extensive use as a tool for analysis, 
autonomous decision making, and optimization in virtually every academic field, including 
economics [3], engineering [11], logistics [12], robotics [13][14], ecology [15][16], and 
many others. The field of wireless communication is no exception, and game theory has a 




For example, the authors of [17] used game theoretic principles to design a 
distributed, adaptive system that controls the transmission power of a wireless device in a 
manner that maximizes energy efficiency while ensuring a consistent quality of service. 
Other devices in the network are viewed as competitors and are tracked using a HMM, 
where the hidden states are the competitors’ wireless channels and where an agent’s 
decision corresponds to the amount of power used to transmit the signal. This scheme 
allows a wireless device to determine if a channel is empty, even in the absence of complete 
information. The utility of each agent’s action is expressed in terms of the agent’s desire 
to increase its signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) (by increasing the transmit 
power) weighed against the cost of the transmission. By combining these two factors in the 
form of a non-cooperative game, each agent is able to adaptively choose the channel that 
minimizes their individual energy consumption while achieving at least the minimal quality 
of service. The authors were able to show the success of their approach through a simulated 
game, which resulted in increased efficiency, in terms of the capacity to power ratio, at the 
cost of implementation complexity. 
In [18], Doshi et al. show how game theory can be applied to resolve denial of 
service (DOS) attacks against wireless ad hoc networks. Specifically, the problem of a gray 
hole attack is discussed in which an intelligent adversary selectively drops packets in order 
to avoid detection. The solution to DOS attacks typically consists of removing the 
malicious node(s) from the network, but, during a gray hole attack, distinguishing a node 
that is unreliable from one that is malicious is difficult. Their paper provides a policy of 
optimal protection against such attacks through a game theoretic description of the 




game. The sender of a packet tracks the reliability of nodes in the network as true detection 
and false alarm rates that are updated over time according to whether the packet was 
ultimately delivered or dropped. These probabilities are then used to determine the utility 
of using the corresponding node and the utility for dropping the node from the network. 
Using a Nash Equilibrium analysis, the authors determine the conditions under which the 
sender should drop a node and under which a malicious node should risk dropping a packet. 
However, it should be noted that the success of their approach was not completely 
demonstrated, nor was it compared against alternative methods of resolving DOS attacks.  
While non-cooperative game theory is often a useful tool for determining resource 
allocation in wireless applications, cooperative solutions have also been successful in the 
past. For example, in [19], Béjar et al. discuss a scheme that uses coalitional game theory 
to reduce resource consumption during target localization. Localization algorithms 
commonly combine distance measurements from multiple wireless sensor networks 
(WSN) in order to achieve more reliable tracking information than a node could obtain 
alone. Typically, measurements from every communicable WSN are used in an effort to 
maximize the reliability of the resulting estimate. However, the authors suggest that 
limiting the number of participating WSNs could extend resources without sacrificing 
accuracy, and they offer a solution that groups WSNs into coalitions, which are determined 
by weighing the costs of communication against the benefits of extra information. The 
members of these coalitions can then share information amongst themselves, benefiting the 
collective group. The utility of a coalition is determined by assessing the coalition’s quality 
against the communication cost of formation. Quality is a function of the summed, squared 




formed through successive steps of merging and splitting existing coalitions, which 
continue until the coalitions converge. The process of selecting coalitions repeats after a 
fixed interval, starting from the set of coalitions previously determined, and, after each 
convergence, the coalition with the highest utility performs the localization task while the 
WSNs from the other coalitions become inactive to conserve energy. While Béjar et al. do 
manage to significantly reduce energy expenditure with their approach, the localization 
error approximately doubled (from 0.34 m), and how these results might change for 






A General Decision Framework 
  
This chapter describes the function and purpose of each of the general framework’s 
components. First, a high-level overview is provided. Then, a structure known as the 
classification matrix is introduced. This chapter concludes with an analysis of each of the 
three main modules, given in the order they occur during the decision making process. 
2.1 Overview of the Decision Framework 
As shown in Figure 1, the framework consists of three modules: the adversary 
identification module, the utility calculator, and the optimizer. The modules act 
sequentially and each is dedicated to a different step in the decision making process. The 
adversary identification module is responsible for processing environmental data. While it 
Figure 1. This figure shows a complete overview of the decision framework. The adversary identification 
module uses observed data and information from the agent library stored in the knowledge base to compute 
the classification matrix for use in the utility calculator module. The expected utilities for each action are 




is not strictly necessary for the framework to function, the information it provides to the 
utility functions increases the accuracy of the utility evaluation. The utility calculator 
module is responsible for evaluating the potential effects of an agent’s actions and is the 
most critical part of the framework. Finally, the optimizer sorts the agent’s responses based 
on those utility and cost values as well as user-defined constraints.  
The first module, adversary identification, begins by analyzing the received 
waveforms in order to determine if they were emitted by an agent. If so, the adversary 
identification module attempts to determine the state of the detected agent. It does this by 
determining the likelihood of receiving the observed data given that the opponent is in a 
given state, 𝑠, for each possible state combination. The probabilities for each state are 
stored in a structure referred to as the classification matrix. Using the classification matrix 
and user-defined utility and cost functions, the utility calculator estimates the expected 
utility and cost of each response through a multi-step process. The utility calculator first 
evaluates the utility and cost of each response for each state combination. Then, it weights 
the utility and cost for each state by the probability of that state’s occurrence. The sum of 
the weighted utilities yields the average utility a response can be expected to produce, 
known as the expected utility of the response. The optimizer is responsible for selecting 
the action an agent will take. This is accomplished by ranking the actions available to the 
agent from most to least preferable. Preference is determined from a combination of the 






2.2 Classification Matrix 
 The classification matrix stores the joint probability of each state as computed by 
the adversary identification module, and its configuration is shown in Figure 2. The 
classification matrix provides a means of tempering the agent so it does not overvalue 
unlikely states or discount low-value states. 
For each other agent in the environment (friend or foe), the adversary identification 
module determines the likelihood that the received waveform was generated by each of the 
models in the agent’s library and also estimates the likelihood that the waveform was 
generated in a certain mode. The rows of the classification matrix account for the modes 
that the detected agent could be operating in while the columns account for the various 
models in the library. The final column is, optionally, used to account for the possibility 
that the correct model is not in the library. The intersection of a column and a row is a state, 
and the value of the classification matrix for that state is the likelihood of that state 
occurring given the observed data. Since the detected agent must be operating in some 
Figure 2. This figure is the general form of the classification matrix. Each index of the matrix represents a 
different state. The rows represent the different modes of operation in which the opponent could be operating, 
and the columns represent the different models for the opposing agent. The value of the classification matrix 




mode and must belong to a model type (even if that model is unknown), the classification 
matrix for each detected agent in the environment is constrained to sum to 1. If it is assumed 
that the library of models is comprehensive (i.e. that there are no unknown models), then 
the classification matrix is normalized to satisfy this constraint, thereby providing the joint 
probability of each state. These probabilities are later used as weights for the outputs of the 
utility calculator for the purpose of calculating the expected utility for a given action.  
2.3 Adversary Identification Module 
 The adversary identification module’s main responsibility is to compute the 
classification matrix. This process is heavily reliant on a library of models containing 
information about the different types of agents that may be present in the environment. 
This information may include averages or ranges for a large number of parameters. If 
models are not available, the performance of the framework will suffer because the agent 
will not be able to make informed decisions. This heavy reliance on models could be 
viewed as a potential weakness of the framework.  
In order to compute the classification matrix, the adversary identification module 
compares the received waveforms to the models in the library and attempts to determine 
which model best matches the observed waveform. This task can be viewed as a 
classification problem that can be solved using various unsupervised machine learning 
techniques, such as Gaussian mixture models (GMM) [20] or support vector machines 
(SVM) [21]. If training data is readily available, supervised machine learning algorithms 




application presented in Chapter 3, the classification matrix was implemented using an 
auto-regressive model. The details of the implementation are given in Section 3.3. 
2.4 Utility Calculator 
Using the classification matrix and a set of utility functions, the utility calculator 
determines the expected utility of each action. Recall that the utility functions are the 
method through which an agent quantifies the benefit received from taking an action. 
Utility functions are typically, but not necessarily, dependent on both the state of the 
opponent, 𝑠, as well as environmental factors, 𝜃. The expected utility, 𝑈, of an action, 𝑎, 
is found in three steps. First, the action’s utility function is evaluated for each state, 𝑠. Then, 
the utility values of each state are weighted by the corresponding probability stored in the 
classification matrix. Finally, the weighted utilities are summed over all possible states. 
The expected utility can be compactly expressed as  
 𝑈𝑎(𝜃) = ∑ 𝑢𝑎(𝑠, 𝜃)𝑝(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑆
, (1) 
where 𝑆 is the set of all opponent states, 𝑢𝑎 is the utility function for action 𝑎, and 𝑝(𝑠) is 
the probability of state 𝑠. The probabilistic weighting prevents the framework from over-
valuing unlikely yet high-utility states and results in rational behavior as long as the set of 
utility functions satisfy the VNM rationality requirements. If applicable, the utility 
calculator can also compute the expected cost of an action using an analogous set of cost 
functions in place of the utility functions in (1). The resulting expected cost can, optionally, 






The final module ranks the options available to the agent. There are many different, 
yet valid, ways to rank an agent’s responses. Without constraints, the most logical approach 
would be to rank the actions from highest expected utility to lowest. Otherwise, cost 
constraints can be used to prohibit the agent from taking actions that are too expensive. 
Additionally, when multiple responses can be performed simultaneously, responses can be 
ranked according to the highest combined utility subject to some cost threshold. A more 
complex optimization strategy could combine dissimilar actions in order to maximize 
worst-case performance. Ultimately, the optimization approach is determined by user 
preference.  
When the optimizer is combined with the adversary identification and utility 
calculator modules, the resulting system is capable of choosing rational actions based on 
observed data and user-defined constraints. The following chapter will provide an example 
of how the general framework can be applied to the problem of providing decision support 





An Electronic Warfare Application 
 
This chapter details how the general framework was implemented to provide 
decision support for the example problem of an EW conflict between a jammer and an 
emitter. Section 3.1 reintroduces the problem and underlying assumptions and gives an 
overview of how the classification matrix was implemented. The implementation of the 
adversary identification module is discussed in Section 3.2. Finally, the design and 
rationale behind the jammer’s utility functions are provided in Section 3.3. 
3.1 Framework Implementation 
The efficacy of the framework is shown through an example problem consisting of 
a non-cooperative game in an EW environment. As mentioned in Chapter 1, several 
assumptions are made to limit the complexity of the example problem. First, the number 
of agents in the environment is limited to a single emitter and a single radar jammer. 
Second, the agents behave antagonistically toward each other and both seek to optimize 
their own expected utility. Third, the agents are limited in the number of actions they can 
take. Fourth, during the game, the actions of each agent are determined using its respective 
implementation of the framework discussed in Chapter 2.  
There are several different approaches that could be used to calculate the 
classification matrix. A standard approach is to use a recursive Bayesian estimator, such as 
a particle filter, which updates the distribution (i.e. the classification matrix) after each 




measurements skew the distribution. Another option views the problem as a type of multi-
class classification, wherein data from the environment are compared against agent models 
to find the best match. In [23], neural nets were used to classify a radar using two separate 
case studies. The first case study was able to determine if a radar was hostile, while the 
second was able to accurately classify the radar’s mode. In [24], Liu et al used clustering 
methods to classify radar returns. Using their algorithm, they were able to correctly 
determine which radar emitted a signal with 93% accuracy. Section 3.2 details how the 
classification matrix is generated and updated for the EW application.  
In Figure 3, the general form of the classification matrix is shown for a jammer 
with n emitter models and m detected emitters. Each entry is the joint probability that the 
waveform emanated from an emitter of a specific model type while operating in a certain 
mode. The emitter models are denoted as EMj and shown in the columns. The models 
represent different types of emitters that could be found in the environment. Each block of 
rows, Ei, represents the i
th emitter agent detected in the environment. Each row inside a 
block represents one of the different operating modes: Anti-BN, Anti-RSN, Anti-DN, Anti-
Figure 3. The general layout of the Classification Matrix for the jammer. Each column, EM j, corresponds to 
a different emitter model. Each block of rows, Ei, represents the ith emitter detected in the environment. 
Each row inside a block represents a different operating mode: Anti-BN, Anti-RSN, etc. An element in the 




RFT, and Anti-VGPO. In general, however, the matrix does not have to be limited to these 
five modes; rather, it can be expanded to include different modes for each emitter. An 
additional column is added to account for the cases where the adversarial model may not 
be in the library. As shown in Figure 3. The elements of the matrix are constrained to sum 
to m. This constraint comes about because there are m agents, and the conditional 
probabilities for each agent summed across all models and modes is one. Using this 
condition, the probability of an unknown adversarial model can be determined by 
subtracting the sum of the other columns from 1. The information in Figure 3 is valid for 
either an emitter or a jammer classification matrix; they differ only in which modes an 
agent can utilize and the models in the library. 
The design of the utility functions are the most critical aspect of the framework 
implementation because they control how the agent evaluates its actions. Even if the rest 
of the framework is operating perfectly, inaccurate or poorly designed utility functions may 
result in irrational decisions. For the jammer, five utility functions were developed to 
calculate the utility for five techniques: BN, RSN, DN, RFT, and VGPO. For the emitter, 
analog utility functions were constructed to counter each of the corresponding jamming 
attacks. The utility functions were constrained to be functions of only a single variable in 
order to reduce the complexity of the analysis. 
BN and RSN are similar techniques and, thus, base their utility function calculation 
on an estimated Jamming-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) value. Since RSN will use a lower 
bandwidth than BN, the JSR for RSN should have a higher utility value than BN, if both 
attacks use the same amount of energy. For DN, the utility is computed based on the 




estimates the number of false targets it can generate within a single dwell. The utility is 
then based on the ratio between the number of false targets and the maximum number of 
targets the emitter can simultaneously track. The utility for the VGPO attack is based on 
the amount of time that the jammer estimates it can deceive the emitter into following a 
false track. Each emitter is assumed to be able to recognize a false track once the target and 
the false track are sufficiently separated. Therefore, the amount of time the jammer can 
mislead the emitter is calculated as a function of the velocities of the target, the false track, 
and the minimum distance at which the emitter can identify the subterfuge. Both RFT and 
VGPO require information that is dependent on the model of the emitter. This information 
is assumed to be provided in the library of models.  
Table 1. This table gives the values of the emitter’s utility functions. The utility functions are dependent on 
the jammer’s mode. The rows each represent one of the emitter’s utility functions. The columns each 
represent a different jammer action (i.e. one of the jammer’s modes).  
 BN RSN DN VGPO RFT 
Anti-BN 0.675 0.525 0.375 0.000 0.000 
Anti-RSN 0.525 0.675 0.375 0.000 0.000 
Anti-DN 0.375 0.375 0.600 0.000 0.000 
Anti-VGPO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.975 0.675 
Anti-RFT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.675 0.975 
Since the behavior of the emitter is not the focus of the research, the emitter utility 
functions were not a primary focus in the implementation of the game. The emitter utility 
functions depend only on the mode of the opponent and are listed in Table 1. Each mode 
is designed to counteract one of the jammer’s attacks. It is also assumed that the modes 
also provide utility against attacks similar to the one it counters. For example, BN, RSN, 
and DN are all masking jamming techniques, so Anti-BN is effective against each of them. 
Likewise, VGPO and RFT are both deception techniques, so Anti-VGPO is effective 




the utility of the modes that counter masking techniques because the deception attacks are 
stronger threats. 
Originally, instead of the utility function returning a constant value for a given 
jammer mode, the emitter’s utility was a random variable constrained on a small interval. 
However, this randomness violated VNM rationality (i.e., completeness did not hold) and 
caused the emitter to choose actions irrationally. With mode-dependent utility functions, 
the emitter tends to select the action that counteracts the most likely jammer mode, but, 
because the emitter is maximizing its expected utility, it may choose to counteract a mode 
other than the one which is most likely. Since the emitter has limited knowledge of the 
opponent’s state, it will not always be able to select the optimal response. This problem – 
reasoning in the presence of uncertainty – is the motivation behind using a game theoretic 
approach for decision support. Optimizing over expected utility allows the agent to 
maximize its average case performance.  
The total cost for a jamming attack is determined by computing four values which 
are then weighted and summed together: the percent of the maximum available power used 
for the attack, the amount of energy expended by the attack, the opportunity cost of using 
the attack, and the “detectability” of the attack. In general, the weights assigned to the 
individual costs are based on user preference for a specific application. Since the optimizer 
was implemented to choose the attack with the highest utility, the cost functions do not 
contribute to the decisions made by the agent in the simulation. As a result, the optimizer 
will always sort the actions from best to worst in the order of decreasing utility, regardless 




3.2 Implementation of the Adversary Identification Module 
The classification matrix is updated over time to account for new data using an auto-
regressive model. Because of the difficulty in obtaining authentic EW data and agent 
models, data were randomly generated based an agent’s action. At each time step, an agent 
receives an observation that is used to determine a measurement of the opponent’s previous 
action. The agent receives the correct measurement with probability 𝑝. If the agent receives 
a wrong measurement, it is equally likely to receive a measurement of each of the other 
modes. In general, the value of 𝑝 may differ between agent models. As such, the 
measurements themselves may be different for each model. If mode 𝑖 was measured, the 
corresponding measurement vector, 𝑚, would be expressed as  
 
𝑚(𝑗) = {
0,    𝑗 ≠ 𝑖
1,    𝑗 = 𝑖
 . 
(2) 
The matrix 𝑀𝑡 is composed of the column-vector measurements at time 𝑡 for each 
of the agent models. The classification matrix is updated over time according to 
 
𝐶𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑀𝑡, 
(3) 
where 𝐶𝑡 is the classification matrix at time 𝑡 and 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 is the learning rate. The 
learning rate adjusts how quickly the agent responds to new data. A high learning rate is 
sensitive to noise, while a low learning rate will cause the agent to take longer to respond 
to the opponent. For the agent models in the simulation, a value of 0.8 was used for 𝑝. The 
jammer’s learning rate was set at 0.1; the emitter used a value of 0.25 for the learning rate. 
The emitter requires a higher learning rate because its utility functions are more mode-
dependent than the jammer’s, and, as a result, the classification matrix has more influence 




3.3 Implementation of the Utility Functions 
For the utility values to be consistent across attacks, the parameters (JSR, the 
number of false targets, etc.) discussed in Section 3.1 are weighted, shifted, and passed 
through a logistic function, given by (4). This process accounts for the dissimilarities 
between the parameters and maps the utility onto the unit interval, thus allowing for the 








where 𝛼 and 𝜇 are tuning parameters used to account for inconsistencies in the distributions 
of the parameters. The problem with this approach is that the values of 𝛼 and 𝜇 are 
subjective and potentially difficult to balance with respect to the other utility functions. 
This problem of determining 𝛼 and 𝜇 conflicts with the modular design of the framework, 
because it becomes more difficult to add or remove utility functions. To address this, a 
process was developed to solve for 𝛼 and 𝜇 in a less subjective way. For each attack, two 
inputs (typically upper and lower bounds) were chosen and assigned values. Let 𝜃1and 𝜃2 
be the inputs to a utility function, and let 𝑢1and 𝑢2 be their respective desired outputs. 
Then, a logistic function of the form (4) can be found to uniquely satisfy these points where 
the values of 𝛼 and 𝜇 can be expressed as 




 𝜇 =  







  𝑐1 = ln (
𝑢2
−1 −  1
𝑢1−1 − 1
) (7) 
  𝑐2 =
ln(𝑢2
−1 −  1)
ln(𝑢1−1 −  1)
. (8) 
 
Each attack uses a different parameter for 𝜃 in (4). Barrage Noise and Responsive 








where 𝑃𝑗 and 𝑃𝑡 are the peak transmit power of the jammer and the emitter, respectively; 
𝐺𝑗 and 𝐺𝑡 are the transmit gains of the jammer and the emitter, respectively; 𝑑𝑗 is the duty 
cycle of the jammer; 𝑅 is the distance between the jammer and the emitter; 𝐵𝑗 is the 
bandwidth of the jammer; 𝜎 is the RCS of the target which, in this case, is the jammer, 
because the jammer is self-screening; 𝑛 is the number of pulses emitted by the emitter; and 
𝜏 is the pulse width of the emitter’s signal [4]. The JSR was chosen because it directly 
relates to the probability of detection of a target. Since the objective of the jammer is to 
minimize the probability of detection, ideally the probability of detection would be used in 
the utility function. However, the probability of detection itself may not be observable in 
some scenarios. The JSR is a natural choice as a substitute for probability of detection 
because the probability of detection decreases as the JSR increases.  
For DN, the argument of the utility function was chosen to be the difference 
between the SNR and the SINR, which are given by the equations 


















where 𝜆 is the signal wavelength, 𝐿𝑠 is the emitter’s system losses, 𝐵 is the emitter’s 
bandwidth, 𝑘 is Boltzmann’s constant, 𝑇 is the reference noise temperature, and 𝐹 is the 
emitter’s receiver noise factor [4]. The difference on a linear scale between (10) and (11) 
provides an estimate of the effectiveness of the jammer’s attacks. The SNR value is an 
indicator of how well an emitter can detect objects in the environment, and the SINR value 
is a similar estimate but includes the presence of interference. The difference between the 
two values can be interpreted as a measure of how effectively the jammer inhibits the 
emitter from detecting targets in the scene.  
For both RFT and VGPO, an assumption is made that the emitter has limitations 
that are known ahead of time and stored in the knowledge base’s library. These limitations 
are used to determine the values of the parameters input into the utility functions. The RFT 
utility function assumes that the emitter can only keep track of at most 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 targets. The 
value of 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 may be different for each emitter model but is assumed to be known a priori. 
The VGPO utility function assumes that the emitter cannot distinguish between the true 
target and a false track until they are a distance of 𝑑 away from each other. Again, the value 
of 𝑑 can differ between emitter models but must be known ahead of time.  
When a jammer utilizes RFT to attack an emitter, the emitter is forced to respond 
in one of two ways. The emitter can either simultaneously track all of the received returns, 
or, when the number of potential tracks exceeds the maximum number of tracks that the 
emitter can maintain, it must decide which returns to track. Therefore, the RFT utility 




resources by forcing it to track false targets. The second is by decreasing the probability 
that the correct target is selected to be tracked.  
For each false track that the emitter decides to track, the jammer is awarded with a 
small amount of utility, 𝜖. Since the jammer does not know which false tracks the emitter 
is tracking, the jammer assumes each track is accepted with probability 𝑃𝑎. Therefore, if 
the jammer generates 𝑁𝐹𝑇 false tracks, it is rewarded with a utility totaling 𝑢𝑅𝐹𝑇 =
 𝜖𝑃𝑎𝑁𝐹𝑇. The amount of utility gained by forcing the emitter to track a false target cannot 
exceed 𝜔 =  𝜖𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 because the emitter cannot track any additional returns and, after that 
point, generating additional tracks would not cause the emitter to expend additional 
resources. The value of 𝜔 acts as a ceiling on the amount of utility that the jammer can 
accrue by forcing the emitter to expend resources. The value of 𝜔 is required to be less 
than one (a value of 0.3 was used in this example for 𝜔). Note that assigning a value to 𝜔 
also determines the value of 𝜖. However, since each emitter model may have a different 
value for 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥, the value of 𝜖 may be different for each emitter. The jammer estimates 
how many false tracks it can produce using 
 








where f is the maximum number of false targets the jammer can generate per second, PRF, 
is the pulse repetition frequency of the emitter, R, is the range between the jammer and the 
emitter, and 𝒄 is the speed of light. 
Even though producing more than 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 false targets does not cause the emitter to 
expend additional resources, producing additional false targets provides a secondary 
benefit. For the purposes of this simulation, the emitter is constrained to track at most 




When the emitter cannot track all of the returns it receives, a choice must be made as to 
which returns will be tracked. When the emitter is forced to choose which returns will be 
tracked, it may stop tracking critical targets. As the number of false targets increases, the 
probability that the emitter stops tracking a real target increases. Let 𝑁𝑇 represent the 
number of targets the jammer is protecting, and let 𝑁𝑂 represent the number of other 
returns. The utility function rewards the jammer based on the following parameter:  
 
   𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 =  




Since 𝑁𝑂 is unknown, it is assumed to be the worst case of 0 (larger values of 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 result 
in higher utility).  
The parameter defined by (13) is the argument for equation (4) for the RFT utility 
function. When 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 < 1, which implies that the emitter is not saturated (𝑃𝑎𝑁𝐹𝑇  +  𝑁𝑇 < 
𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥), the utility function is linear with a slope of 𝜖. When 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 = 1, the jammer is 
consuming the maximum amount of the emitter’s resources, so it has utility of 𝜔. When 
𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 > 1, the utility function grows exponentially starting from 𝜔 with an upper bound of 
one. The utility function is expressed as  
 𝑢(𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇) =  {
𝜔𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 ,            𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 < 1
𝜔𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇
−1
,              𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 ≥ 1
 .  (14) 
A graph showing a plot of the utility function for 𝜔 =  0.3 is shown in Figure 4. 
Since the aim of RFT is to consume an emitter’s resources over a long period of 
time, a penalty term was applied to the utility function to punish short duration jammer 
attacks. The penalty term has the form  
 𝑤(𝑡) =  1 − 𝑒−
𝑡





where 𝑡 is a user defined parameter that specifies how long the RFT attack should be run 
before searching for a new optimal attack and Τ is a tuning parameter which sets the rate 
at which the penalty decays. The final utility is then given by  
 𝑢(𝑡, 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇) = 𝑤(𝑡)𝑢(𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇). 
(16) 
The utility function for the VGPO attack estimates the amount of time it will take 
before the true target and the false target generated by VGPO separate enough for the 
emitter to be able to differentiate between them. Given that the minimum distance at which 
the emitter can make this distinction is known (𝑑), the only information the jammer 
requires is the speed at which the protected target is moving, the speed of the false track, 
and the orientation between the two. Note that a self-screening jammer protects itself. 
Let the velocity of the target in three dimensions be represented by the vector 𝑣𝑇 
and the velocity of the false track likewise be represented by 𝑣𝐹𝑇.  Both of these vectors lie 
in a standard Euclidean frame centered on the target and are oriented such that the direction 
Figure 4. A plot of the utility function for RFT over θ before the penalty term is applied. This plot uses ω= 
0.3.  On the interval 0<θ<1, the function is linear. For θ≥1, the function is exponential and has a limit of 












]. Also, let 𝑣𝐹𝑇𝑥𝑦 =
√𝑣𝐹𝑇𝑥
2 +  𝑣𝐹𝑇𝑦
2 , 𝑣 =  [
||𝑣𝑇||2
||𝑣𝐹𝑇||2
], and the angles between the orientation of 𝑣𝑇 and 𝑣𝐹𝑇 in 
the xy and yz planes as 𝜙𝑥𝑦 and 𝜙𝑦𝑧 , respectively as 











The amount of time it takes for the target and the false track to separate by a distance 𝑑 is 






where the symmetric matrix 𝐴 is calculated as 
 
𝐴 =  [
1 −cos (𝜙𝑥𝑦)cos (𝜙𝑦𝑧)
−cos (𝜙𝑥𝑦)cos (𝜙𝑦𝑧) 1
].     
(20) 
 
The resulting value of t from (19) was used as the argument for the VGPO utility 
function. Larger values of t represent more effective VGPO attacks and higher utility states. 
However, this choice for a parameter has a clear flaw. From (19), the optimal outcome 
(utility = 1) for the VGPO utility function results when the target and false track both move 
at the same rate in the same direction. This results in an estimate that VGPO can be used 
for an infinite amount of time without the emitter detecting the subterfuge. However, since 
the target and the false track are not separating from each other, the false track and the 




because the emitter is not being pulled away. In fact, it would be better for the jammer not 
to do any attack in this case because VGPO provides an even stronger return and would 
only serve to act as a beacon broadcasting the jammer’s exact location. This flaw is a result 
of the simplicity of the utility function and could easily be accounted for by using a utility 
function that considers multiple parameters.  
In addition to the dependence on the parameters mentioned above, each jammer 
utility function is also dependent on the mode of the emitter. Intuitively, this is because the 
jammer is trying to maximize the success of its actions and does not want to be operating 
in the mode that is being countered by the emitter. The final utility for the action 𝑎 against 
state 𝑠 is given by 
 
𝑢𝑎(𝑠, 𝜃𝑎) = {
0.4𝑢(𝜃𝑎),   if operating mode counters 𝑎
𝑢(𝜃𝑎),              otherwise                          
. 
(21) 
Without state-dependent utility functions, the jammer cannot adapt to the emitter’s 
behavior. Furthermore, the classification matrix would serve no purpose because every 
state would provide the same utility. Also, because the utility functions have an upper 
bound (𝑢𝑎 ≤ 1), the jammer will always be able to adapt its actions in response to the 
emitter as long as there is a viable alternative. For example, the JSR for the RSN and BN 
utility functions scales exponentially with the range between the jammer and the emitter, 
but the utility function itself cannot return a value greater than one. In the simulation, 
because of the upper bound on the utility function, the jammer will switch from RSN to 
VGPO for any arbitrary value of the JSR if it is sufficiently certain that the emitter is using 
Anti-RSN. 
This chapter has shown how the classification matrix, adversary identification 




process for an agent engaging in EW. The following chapter will show the effectiveness of 
the implemented framework through the results of a simulated game in an EW 
environment. The results from the simulation show that both agents perform rationally 








In order to demonstrate the framework, a non-cooperative game was designed and 
simulated using MATLAB. The primary purpose of this game was to evaluate the 
performance of the framework and to analyze the behavior of the jammer under different 
initial conditions. The game was established as a competition between two agents – a 
jammer and an emitter – and the only significant difference between the two agents was 
the set of utility functions each agent utilized. During the game, the objective of each agent 
was to maximize its own utility. For well-designed utility functions, this behavior would 
result in an agent choosing the most rational action. For the jammer, this action was 
typically the attack that was most effective against the emitter’s presumed state. The 
emitter was most effective when it correctly matched defensive strategy to the jammer’s 
attack type.  
Four simulations were run under different initial conditions. The first simulation 
was used as a baseline for comparison with the other three simulations. The second 
simulation focused on decreasing the utility of the most frequently selected attack (RSN) 
to observe how the jammer would adapt its strategy. The third and fourth simulations 
increased the utility for a different jamming attack, VGPO and RFT, respectively. The 
utility of VGPO was increased by decreasing the velocity of the jammer and its false track. 
Using (19), this change resulted in an increase in the value for 𝑡, thereby increasing the 
utility. The utility of RFT was increased by raising the number of false targets that the 




of which lasted for twenty time steps. Across all twenty time steps, the range between the 
jammer and the emitter was held constant, but after each game finished, the range between 
the two agents was increased for the subsequent game. Each simulation used the same set 
of range values, which were chosen to be linearly spaced between 0.1 km and 20 km. At 
each time step, the jammer and the emitter each chose an action according to the expected 
utilities calculated during that time step. Each simulation consisted of a total of 400 
decisions per agent per simulation.  
Table 2. These values are used for the parameters in the simulation and were chosen based on the values 
provided in [4]. 
Emitter Parameter Value Jammer Parameter Value 
Transmit Power (𝑃𝑡) 200 kW Transmit Power (𝑃𝑗) 200 W 
Bandwidth (𝐵) 10 MHz Bandwidth for BN (𝐵𝐵𝑁) 100 MHz 
Gain (𝐺𝑡) 30 dBi Bandwidth for RSN (𝐵𝑅𝑆𝑁) 75 MHz 
Wavelength (𝜆) 0.05 m Bandwidth for DN (𝐵𝐷𝑁) 10 MHz 
Pulse width (𝜏) 2 ns Gain (𝐺𝐽) 15 dBi 
Number of pulses (𝑛) 16 System noise figure (𝐹) 5 dB 
The parameters used to calculate the JSR, SNR, and SINR were taken from [4] and 
are shown in Table 2. Recall that the JSR, given by (9), was used in the utility calculation 
for the BN and RSN attacks and that the SNR and SINR, given by (10) and (11)(10) 
respectively, were used in the utility calculation for the DN attack. Note that, since BN 
attacks use larger bandwidths than RSN attacks, BN should have a lower JSR than RSN 
when all of the other parameters are held equal. As a result, the utility for RSN should 
always be higher than the utility of BN against a single opponent. 
The jammer’s decisions for each of the four simulations are shown in Figure 5, and 
the emitter’s decisions are shown in Figure 6. Each decision is represented by a colored 
block in the figure where each color represents a different jamming attack or emitter action. 




that was simulated for a range of 𝑦 km between the two agents. Note that the y-axis is 
inverted with the short-range games at the top and the long-range games at the bottom. 
 The most interesting aspect of each graph in Figure 5is the way the agents changed 
their actions over time. For example, as shown in Figure 5a, at a range of 10 km, the jammer 
started the game by selecting RSN, continued using RSN for a short duration, and then 
switched to VGPO. The switch resulted from a change in the values of the classification 
Figure 5. The jammer’s decisions are shown for all distances and time steps for each simulation. The first 
simulation (a) acts as a baseline for comparison against the other three simulations. The remaining three 
simulations show the effects of increasing the utility for each of the non-dominant decisions: BN, VGPO, 
and RFT, respectively. 
Figure 6. The emitter’s decisions are shown for each simulation. The colors represent the action the emitter 




matrix. The jammer became more confident that the emitter was in Anti-RSN mode, so it 
changed its action to DN. In Figure 6a, it is shown that the emitter was in fact using Anti-
RSN, so the jammer was justified in switching. Likewise, once the emitter was able to 
determine that the jammer had switched to DN, it started to choose Anti-DN.  
The first time step for each simulation shows which action is dominant at that range 
value. Since no measurements were received during the first time step, the classification 
matrix was uniform and did not contribute toward decision-making. Therefore, the action 
selected at the first time step was always the one that provides the most utility for the given 
range. The dominant attacks at extreme range values were DN for short-range attacks and 
RSN for long-range attacks because their utility functions scaled for short and long-range 
values, respectively. In the mid-range regions, neither DN nor RSN were as strong, so RFT 
and VGPO were more effective. Because the emitter’s utility functions were designed to 
be entirely mode-dependent, the emitter acted as a purely responsive system. As a result, 
the emitter did not form its own regions where a particular action dominates. Instead, it 
mimicked the same regions as the jammer by responding to its actions. It always selected 
Figure 7. Results from the first simulation, which focuses on the effect of the distance between the jammer 
and the emitter on the agents’ decisions, are shown for the jammer and the emitter. This simulation acts as a 




RFT at time 𝑡 = 1 because RFT provided the most utility for a uniform classification 
matrix.  
 The first simulation acted as a baseline for comparison against other simulations, 
and the results of this simulation are shown in Figure 7. Since the utility function for VGPO 
was designed to be range-independent, the first simulation showed the distances at which 
the range-based attacks became dominant over VGPO. While both BN and RSN attacks 
become more effective as the distance between the jammer and emitter increases, the utility 
functions for DN and RFT become less effective as the range increases. The simulation 
results reflected these claims and showed that the jammer started to choose RSN once the 
jammer and emitter were more than 9 km apart. BN was never chosen in the baseline 
simulation because the utility of BN was always strictly less than the utility of RSN. The 
emitter in this simulation behaved as expected by correctly protecting against DN in the 
short-range regions and against RSN in the long-range regions. Furthermore, the emitter 
was able to respond to the jammer’s actions quickly without significant errors. The 
emitter’s learning rate was responsible for this timely adaptation. While increasing the rate 
Figure 8. Results from the second simulation, which analyzes the effect of decreasing the utility of RSN, are 




would decrease response time, it would also increase the emitter’s vulnerability to noisy 
measurements. For example, the emitter occasionally chose Anti-BN, even though the 
jammer never operated in that mode. The emitter received a measurement at every time 
step after the first for a total of 380 measurements. Since there was a 20% probability of 
receiving an incorrect measurement, the emitter was expected to receive around 76 
incorrect measurements. In spite of this problem, the emitter still performed relatively well 
and did not select illogical actions frequently.  
The second simulation showed the effect of increasing the bandwidth value used in 
the computation of the RSN utility; the results are shown in Figure 8. For this simulation, 
the bandwidth of the RSN attack was increased from 75 MHz to 150 MHz in order for the 
RSN bandwidth to be larger than the BN bandwidth. Since the JSR is inversely proportional 
to the bandwidth, the utility of RSN universally decreased, allowing other attacks to be 
selected in its place. The desired effect of this change was to observe whether or not BN 
would be selected instead. As expected, BN was the most commonly selected attack in 
place of RSN. However, since the bandwidth of BN in this simulation was still larger than 
the bandwidth of RSN used in the baseline simulation, the utility of BN in this simulation 
was lower than the utility of RSN in the baseline simulation. Because of this, BN did not 
entirely replace RSN. Since BN was less efficient than the baseline RSN, the jammer 
needed to be further away when performing BN to achieve the same utility. While RSN 
was dominant at 9 km, BN did not become dominant until the range was 11 km or higher. 
Once the jammer was sufficiently far away, BN became as dominant as RSN was in the 
baseline simulation. This fact is shown by Tables 3-5. In the baseline simulation (Figure 



















BN 0 159 0 0 
RSN 167 0 153 157 
DN 83 87 72 60 
VGPO 116 122 149 76 
RFT 34 32 26 107 
 
Table 4. Lists the number of times the jammer selected each attack for each of the four simulations when 














BN 0 129 0 0 
RSN 131 0 121 121 
DN 0 0 0 0 
VGPO 69 71 79 46 
RFT 0 0 0 33 
 
 
Table 5. Lists the number of times the jammer selected each attack for the four simulation when the range 














BN 0 30 0 0 
RSN 36 0 32 36 
DN 83 87 72 60 
VGPO 47 51 70 30 






overall. In the second simulation (Figure 5b), the jammer chose BN 159 times yet only 30 
times (20% less often) when the range was less than 10 km. Since both attacks were chosen 
around the same number of times in their respective simulations when the range was above 
10 km (131 and 129 times respectively), the drop in the number of close-range decisions 
supports the conclusion that the decision region was shifted toward higher range values. In 
this simulation, the emitter behaved as expected: its decisions changed from Anti-RSN to 
Anti-BN in response to the jammer. The emitter still behaved accurately in the short-range 
regions by defending itself from DN properly and, when the jammer switched to VGPO or 
RFT, by quickly switching to the correct defense.  
The third simulation, in which the speeds of both the jammer and the false track 
were reduced from 300 m/s to 250 m/s, is illustrated in Figure 9. This change increased the 
amount of time required for the jammer and the false track to separate from each other, 
allowing the jammer to deceive the emitter for a longer duration. As expected, this change 
increased the number of times that VGPO was selected by the jammer. In the baseline 
simulation, VGPO was selected 116 out of a maximum of 400 times. In the simulation with 
decreased jammer velocity, VGPO was selected 149 times for an increase of 28 percent 
Figure 9. Results from the third simulation, which focuses on increasing the utility of VGPO attacks by 




over baseline. Throughout the simulation, the emitter behaved as expected by correctly 
responding to the jammer’s changing strategy. As a result, it ended up creating decision 
regions similar to the jammer. Furthermore, the emitter appeared to be trailing just behind 
the jammer in many instances.  
The final simulation, shown in Figure 10, focused on increasing the number of false 
targets the jammer can generate in one second, which directly increased the utility for RFT 
by increasing 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 (the main parameter of the RFT utility function, given by (13)). For this 
simulation, the number of false targets generated was doubled, and the number of RFT 
decisions more than tripled from 34 to 107. This result was surprising because the utility 
function for RFT is exponential for 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 greater than 1 (see equation (14)), and the value 
of 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇 must therefore increase dramatically in order to raise the utility by even a small 
amount. Since all of the noise-based attacks scale significantly better with range than RFT 
scales with 𝜃𝑅𝐹𝑇, it was hypothesized that RFT would be unable to overpower the noise-
based attacks at extreme range value and, therefore, that the increase in the number of RFT 
Figure 10. Results from the final simulation, which analyzes the effects of increasing RFT’s utility, are shown 




decisions would be minimal. However, RFT was very successful for medium and close 
range values and was also occasionally chosen at longer ranges.  
The fourth simulation chose VGPO only 76 times, which is a drop of 34 percent 
from baseline, and chose DN only 60 times (down from 83), which is a decrease of 28 
percent. The number of times RSN was chosen, however, only decreased by six percent 
from 167 down to 157. These results occurred because of the slight range dependence 
inherent in the RFT utility function. As the range between the two agents increased, the 
jammer had less time to generate false targets because of the increased time of arrival. In 
other words, because the jammer was further away from the emitter, not all of the false 
targets generated had time to reach the emitter before the end of the time step. As a result, 
the RFT utility function was less effective at longer ranges, which was an unexpected 





Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This thesis introduces a probabilistic framework for rational decision-making in 
wireless environments and presents an example application in the field of electronic 
warfare. By design, the probabilistic framework greedily and myopically maximizes the 
utility gained from choosing an action, and this objective is realized through the 
cooperation of three modules: the adversary identification module which utilizes a 
knowledge base of data to infer the behavior of the other agents, the utility calculator 
module which evaluates the benefit of each action according to predefined utility functions 
and observables, and the optimization module which ranks the actions available to the 
agent. The versatility of these modules allows general application to a variety of wireless 
electronic support applications.  
The example problem provided in Section 3.0 demonstrates an implementation of 
the general framework. Under simplifying assumptions, a contest between a jammer and 
an emitter is simulated under a variety of conditions, where the goal of each agent is to 
derive rational decisions from simple models and observed data. Both agents utilize the 
framework for this purpose in the simulations. The results from the simulations 
demonstrate the behavior of the agents to be both rational and in accordance with 
expectations, and while the agents develop clear decision boundaries where one action 
dominates all others, the results show that the agents are capable adaptation in a reasonable 




It is worth mentioning that the utility functions used in the simulation are designed 
primarily for the purposes of demonstration and experimentation and do not necessarily 
represent the best way to evaluate an action. The utility functions are intentionally designed 
to be different from each other in order to provide insight into how different styles of utility 
functions operate, interact, and influence the decision process. While the utility functions 
are not completely realistic, they are still an effective demonstration of how the generic 
framework can be used to provide rational decision support. 
Further work could focus on improving upon the weaknesses of the framework. 
The current framework is limited to two-player applications. For adversaries, this 
restriction is easily addressed by abstracting the classification matrix into three dimensions 
(as shown in Figure 3) to account for multiple opponents. The optimization module would 
then seek to choose the action that maximizes the weighted sum of the expected utility 
against each opponent. Generalizing the framework to allow for cooperation between 
friendly agents is more difficult. The main areas of focus could include adapting the 
adversary identification module to incorporate shared information and shifting toward a 
centralized optimizer that could distribute the combined capabilities and resources of the 
allied agents optimally. This extension would be a promising area for further research. 
Another limitation is the myopic nature of the framework; i.e. the current framework only 
maximizes the current utility. From a game-theoretic perspective, planning ahead in order 
to account for an opponent’s strategy is often advantageous; a greedy strategy is not 
necessarily optimal over the course of several time steps. Through clever use of the models 
stored in the knowledge base, prediction of the future actions of the opponent would be 
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